249 N.W. 776
File No. 6178.Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Opinion filed July 29, 1933.
Page 684
Appeal from the District Court of McHenry County, Grimson, J., from a judgment in favor of the defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
L.J. Palda, Jr., C.E. Brace and Robert W. Palda, for appellant.
A verbal acceptance of an offer is sufficient when the offer does not require a written acceptance. Turner v. McCormick, 56 W. Va. 161, 49 S.E. 28, 67 L.R.A. 853.
One to whom a proposition is made may accept by conduct, creating a contract as binding as if acceptance had been in words. Hankins v. Young, 174 Iowa, 383, 156 N.W. 380.
There is no contract for public work till the actual written instrument is signed, but each party is under liability by reason of offer and acceptance to sign and each is entitled to a remedy, if either refuses. Inge v. Board of Public Works, 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 687, 93 Am. St. Rep. 20; 19 R.C.L. 1068; 28 Cyc. 663.
Except in so far as controlled by statute, the validity of a contract of employment of a teacher in the public schools is governed by rules relating to contracts generally. Spence v. School Dist. 121 Neb. 64, 236 N.W. 145; Clark v. Wild Rose Special Dist. 47 N.D. 297, 182 N.W. 307; Leland v. School Dist. 77 Minn. 469, 80 N.W. 354.
A contract to make and execute a certain written agreement, the terms of which are mutually understood and agreed upon, is in all respects as valid and obligatory, where no statutory objection interposes, as the written contract itself would be if executed. Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co. 144 N.Y. 209, 43 Am. St. Rep. 757.
Nels G. Johnson and Albert Weber, for respondent.
A school teacher employed by a common school district is an employee, the relationship between her (him) and the school board is that of contract only. Mootz v. Belyea, 60 N.D. 741, 236 N.W. 358, 75 A.L.R. 134.
School officers have and may exercise only such limited powers as are expressly or impliedly granted by statute. Gillespie v. School Dist. 56 N.D. 194, 216 N.W. 564.
A school district board must act as a unit in the transaction of school business, and it is not bound by any agreement between a member acting as an individual and the teacher. Auran v. School Dist. 60 N.D. 223, 233 N.W. 644.
Page 685
Where jury is waived, court findings are presumptively correct and will not be disturbed unless clearly opposed to the preponderance of the evidence. Corvin v. Wells, 264 N.W. 918.
But a hiring contract for less than one year, to begin at a date so far in the future that the performance of the contract extends beyond one year from the time of its making, is within the statute of frauds. 27 C.J. 186; Franco v. Caruso, 158 N.Y. Supp. 551; Chase v. Hinkley (Wis.) 105 N.W. 230.
The time within which a contract is to be performed is reckoned from the making of the contract, not from the time the performance is to begin. 27 L.R.A. 668.
BIRDZELL, J.
This is an action to recover damages for the refusal of the defendant school corporation to execute a teacher’s contract with the plaintiff. The complaint alleges and the evidence shows that the defendant, in April, 1931, through its board of directors, offered to employ the plaintiff as principal for the school year of 1931-1932 at a salary of $2,050; and that thereafter the plaintiff accepted the offer, since which time he has been ready, willing and able to teach the school and to perform, as well as execute, a contract in writing; but that the defendant declined to execute a contract in writing, or to allow the plaintiff to enter upon the performance of his oral contract. The only question we need consider on the appeal is whether or not these facts form a legal basis of an action for damages against the defendant school district.
The statute outlining the powers of a school board with respect to the employment of teachers specifically provides (Comp. Laws 1913, § 1178) that “every contract for the employment of a teacher must be in writing and such contract must be executed before such teacher begins to teach in such school.” This statute is mandatory, and to hold that the school district could be held liable on account of having entered into an oral contract to execute a written contract would be to deprive the statute of its force. We are not concerned with the reasons which might have appealed to the legislature in fixing the requirement that teachers’ contracts must be in writing. Suffice it to say that substantial reasons for such requirement might well be found to exist. Where the law prescribes formalities for the formation of public contracts, such as a written contract, no contract is formed until this
Page 686
formality has been complied with. Griggs v. School Dist. 87 Ark. 93, 112 S.W. 215; Edge Moor Bridge Works v. Bristol County, 170 Mass. 528, 49 N.E. 918; Voorhees, Public Schools, § 64; 1 Williston, Contr. § 31.
It follows that the action was properly dismissed and that the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered.
NUESSLE, Ch. J., and BURKE, CHRISTIANSON and BURR, JJ., concur.